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Abstract 
Since the time of Denning’s2 model for the intrusion detection system (IDS), the system that laid the basis for most modern 
IDSes, intrusion detection technologies have grown in both complexity and sophistication. Yet challenges related to accuracy, 
management, and the detection of new attacks abound. This work focuses on the management issue. Specifically, it addresses the 
problem of determining the enabled and disabled states of rules in a rule-based IDS. Knowing the state of a rule in this regard is 
important because a rule-based IDS can detect a particular event only if it has a rule to detect that event and that rule is enabled.
This work develops an algorithm to monitor the enabled/disabled state of rules of a signature based IDS. Given a particular action 
that a rule would execute when invoked, the algorithm proceeds as follows: (1) it searches through each of the rule sets (sets of
rules having similar characteristics) for rules bearing the given action, (2) for each such rule, it determines whether that rule is 
enabled or disabled, and (3) for each rule set, it reports the total number of enabled and disabled rules, and creates two files
containing the line numbers from the rule set where each enabled and disabled rule, respectively, could be found. The algorithm
is implemented in Python and is ran against Snort as a test case. Statistical results were obtained and the following are some of 
the findings: (a) the vast majority of rules are inactive by default, (b) of all the actions that could be taken when a rule is invoked, 
the ALERT action far outpaced its counterparts, and (c) from the rule versions that were examined, it was found that the number
of rules are growing significantly. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, intrusion detection technologies have grown in both complexity and sophistication1,8,19. Yet 
challenges related to accuracy, management, and the detection of new attacks abound. This work focuses on the 
management issue. Specifically, it develops an algorithm to monitor the on (enable) and off (disable) state of rules in 
rule-based IDSes, and reports the related statistical findings. Hence, in the context of this paper, management means 
the monitoring and reporting of the enabled and disabled state of rules.   
To elucidate the discussion, we provide definitions of a few IDS key terms. These terms are adopted from NIST 
Special Publication 800-9414. It describes intrusion detection as the process of monitoring the events occurring in a 
computer system or network and analysing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent 
threats of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices. An IDS is 
described as a software application that automates the intrusion detection process. An intrusion prevention system 
(IPS) is a software application that has all the capabilities of an intrusion detection system, but can also attempt to 
stop possible incidents. For brevity, the term intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) is sometimes used to 
refer to both IDS and IPS. We shall adopt that convention here. 
Modern IDPSes usually employ one of three detection methodologies to detect incidences: signature based, 
anomaly based, and stateful protocol analysis14. A signature is a pattern that corresponds to a known threat. 
Signature (or rule) based detection is the process of comparing signatures against observed events to identify 
possible incidents. Rules contain the information that enable the IDS to take a specific action (such as, sending an 
alert, blocking an attack or dropping offending packets), should a potential malicious event present itself. Rule based 
systems are the most widely deployed IDPSes and perform best when the signature information is accurate, and the 
rules derived from them are precisely constructed by an expert. However, as new attacks are discovered and software 
systems change, some existing rules become irrelevant and construction of new rules become necessary. Indeed, 
over the past few years, attacks have increased at an alarming rate, raising concerns in both the private and public 
sectors9,4. In an effort to keep pace with attacks and threats, the number of rules has similarly increased, including in 
some of the most popularly used signature based systems, such as Snort11, Network Flight Recorder (NFR)5,
RealSecure20 and Dragon13. In turn, researchers are developing ways of automating the rule management process. 
For example, Stakhanova and Ghorbani17 developed a method to discover inconsistencies within rules, and 
Stakhanova et al.18 developed a method to discover conflicts within rules. Another issue is the timely creation of 
rules6. Since rule creation is still a manual process, there will usually be a varying lag between discovery of an attack 
and the creation of a rule to take some defensive action, should that attack present itself again. Thus, automatic 
creation of rules is an active area of research6,3,12. Perhaps the most serious disadvantage of signature based systems 
is their ineffectiveness against zero-day attacks (unknown attacks, occurring for the first time)7. Anomaly-based 
detection is the process of comparing definitions of what activity is considered normal against observed events to 
identify significant deviations14. Stateful protocol analysis is the process of comparing predetermined profiles of 
generally accepted definitions of benign protocol activity for each protocol state against observed events to identify 
deviations.  
This work focuses on signature-based detection and the issue of monitoring the enabled/disabled state in a rule 
based IDS. Upon the initial install of rules in a rule based system, such as Snort11, there will be a set of rules with a 
default state of enabled; all others will be disabled. This is so for a variety of reasons, including: (1) some rules are 
network dependent; and (2) signature based systems are computationally intensive and become more so as the 
number of rules in that enabled grow. However, when a rule is disabled, the IDS is unable to detect attacks that the 
rule was defined to detect. Once an IDS is installed, the responsibility for maintaining it is usually assigned to the 
busy system administrator. The administrator must determine the current enabled/disabled state of rules, and what 
additional rules should be enabled based on the needs of the network. If rules are inadvertently or maliciously 
disabled, the administrator needs to know so that appropriate actions can be taken. Thus, information, such as total 
number of rules, how many, and what rules are enabled or disabled can be helpful in increasing the administrator’s 
effectiveness in managing rules and hence improving the overall effectiveness of an IDS. This work develops an 
algorithm with the capability to monitor the enabled or disabled state of rules, and record the number of rules in each 
such state and their location. The algorithm also provides periodic updates on the enabled/disabled state of rules. 
Finally, it is implemented in Python, ran against Snort IDS, and statistical findings are reported. 
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2. Methods  
Stakhanova et al.18 define an intrusion detection rule as a tuple ( , )i i iR C A , where iC   is a predicate defined on a set 
of conditions 1 2, , , nc c c  and iA   is an action. A condition ic C   is defined as the tuple, ( , ),f v  where f is a field 
monitored by the IDPS (e.g., IP protocol, TCP access, file access) and v represent the numerical or descriptive value 
(or range of values) applied to a corresponding feature. The following is a simple Snort rule16, 1R =Rule 1: 
ALERT tcp any any -> 192.168.1.0/24 111 \ 
(content:"|00 01 86 a5|"; msg:"mountd access";) 
This rule sends an alert if the packet is a TCP packet originating from any IP address and any port, and destined to 
port 111 of the internal network 192.168.1.0/24. In Snort jargon, the text up to the left parenthesis is called the rule 
header. The section enclosed in the parentheses contains the rule options. The words before the colons in the rule 
options section are called option keywords (or just options). The action, 1A , in this example is ALERT. ALERT is 
simply one among eight actions that Snort could take when it encounters an event deemed suspicious by its rule 
base. The complete list is as follows: 
x ALERT - Generate an alert using the selected ALERT method, and then log the packet
x LOG - Log the packet
x PASS - Ignore the packet
x ACTIVATE - Alert and then turn on another dynamic rule
x DYNAMIC - Remain idle until activated by an activate rule , then act as a log rule
x DROP - Block and log the packet
x REJECT - Block the packet, log it, and then send a TCP reset if the protocol is TCP or an ICMP port unreachable 
message if the protocol is UDP
x SDROP - Block the packet but do not log it.
The Snort rule, R1, can be cast in the general language used for a rule in the following way:  
If protocol=tcp source_ip=any source_port=any destination_ip192.168.1.0/24 
destination_port=111 content:"|00 01 86 a5|"  Alert
We define a rule set as a file consisting of a set (or category) of rules that share a common set of characteristics.
Since an IDPS typically uses multiple rule sets, we denote a rule set by ,iS and assume that there are m such rule sets. 
Also, we introduce a second subscript in the notation for the rule to denote it as 
i jR . Further, it is assumed that each 
rule set contains in  rules 1 2, ,..., ji i inR R R .
Our goal is to develop an algorithm that monitors the collection of rulesets { , 1,2,..., }iS S i m  so as to identify the 
state of each rule in each rule set, in terms of whether it is enabled or disabled, and to build useful statistics based on 
these findings. The algorithm should also provide periodic updates of this information. This may be accomplished 
by running it as a daemon with an appropriately selected specified period. We call the algorithm Rule Status 
Monitoring Algorithm (RSMA). It is given as follows: 
Rule Status Monitoring Algorithm: 
Variables: The following variables are used: i, the rule set name index; j, the rule index; k, the rule action index; m, the number 
of rulesets; n, the number of rule actions; off_counter, counts of the number of rules that are off; on_counter, counts the number 
of rules that are off; ON, array containing the line numbers of rules that are on for a given action and ruleset; OFF, array 
containing the line numbers of rules that are off for a given action and ruleset. 
Algorithm:
Obtain and store the name of each rule set into a file named rulesets
Determine the total number of rule sets, m, in the rulesets file 
Assume that each rule is stored on a separate and single line index by j  
Assume that there are n possible rule actions stored in array action 
Read the rulesets file 
For(k=1:n) 
Select a rule action of interest 
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For(i=1:m) 
Obtain the name for rule set, ௜ܵ, by reading line i of the rulesets file 
Read the file consisting of the rules for ௜ܵ
Initialize arrays ON and OFF to 0; to keep track of rules that are on and off, respectively 
Let j=1, on_counter = 0, off_counter = 0 
While (not end of file)      
Read rule[j]   
If (rule[j] uses action a[k]) 
If( rule[j] is on) 
on_counter = on_counter + 1 
ON[on_counter] = j 
Else 
 off_counter = off_counter + 1 
   OFF[off_counter] = j   
j = j + 1 
End While 
If( on_counter != 0)  
Write ON array to file [‘on_rules’ + ruleset[i] + date + time] 
If(off_counter != 0) 
Write OFF array to file ‘off_rules’ + ruleset[i] + date + time 
End For 
End For
Table 1. Rule sets residing in the Rules folder.
1. app-detect.rules 
2. attack-
responses.rules 
3. backdoor.rules 
4. bad-traffic.rules 
5. blacklist.rules
6. botnet-cnc.rules 
7. browser-
chrome.rules 
8. browser-firefox.rules 
9. browser-ie.rules 
10. browser-other.rules 
11. browser-
plugins.rules 
12. browser-webkit.rules 
13. chat.rules 
14. content-replace.rules 
15. ddos.rules 
16. deleted.rules
17. dns.rules 
18. dos.rules 
19. experimental.rules 
20. exploit-kit.rules
21. exploit.rules
22. file-executable.rules
23. file-flash.rules
24. file-identify.rules
25. file-image.rules 
26. file-java.rules 
27. file-multimedia.rules 
28. file-office.rules 
29. file-other.rules 
30. file-pdf.rules 
31. finger.rules 
32. ftp.rules 
33. icmp-info.rules 
34. icmp.rules 
35. imap.rules 
36. indicator-
compromise.rules 
37. indicator-obfuscation.rules 
38. indicator-scan.rules 
39. indicator-shellcode.rules 
40. info.rules 
41. local.rules 
42. malware-backdoor.rules 
43. malware-cnc.rules 
44. malware-other.rules 
45. malware-tools.rules 
46. misc.rules 
47. multimedia.rules 
48. mysql.rules 
49. netbios.rules
50. nntp.rules 
51. oracle.rules 
52. os-linux.rules 
53. os-mobile.rules 
54. os-other.rules 
55. os-solaris.rules 
56. os-windows.rules 
57. other-ids.rules 
58. p2p.rules 
59. phishing-spam.rules 
60. policy-multimedia.rules 
61. policy-other.rules 
62. policy-social.rules 
63. policy-spam.rules 
64. policy.rules 
65. pop2.rules 
66. pop3.rules 
67. protocol-dns.rules 
68. protocol-finger.rules 
69. protocol-ftp.rules 
70. protocol-icmp.rules 
71. protocol-imap.rules 
72. protocol-nntp.rules 
73. protocol-other.rules 
74. protocol-pop.rules 
75. protocol-rpc.rules 
76. protocol-scada.rules 
77. protocol-
services.rules 
78. protocol-snmp.rules 
79. protocol-telnet.rules 
80. protocol-tftp.rules 
81. protocol-voip.rules 
82. pua-adware.rules 
83. pua-other.rules 
84. pua-p2p.rules 
85. pua-toolbars.rules 
86. rpc.rules 
87. rservices.rules 
88. scada.rules 
89. scan.rules
90. server-apache.rules 
91. server-iis.rules 
92. server-mail.rules 
93. server-mssql.rules 
94. server-mysql.rules 
95. server-oracle.rules 
96. server-other.rules 
97. server-samba.rules 
98. server-webapp.rules 
99. shellcode.rules 
100. smtp.rules 
101. snmp.rules 
102. specific-
threats.rules 
103. spyware-put.rules 
104. sql.rules
105. telnet.rules 
106. tftp.rules
107. virus.rules 
108. voip.rules 
109. web-activex.rules 
110. web-attacks.rules 
111. web-cgi.rules 
112. web-client.rules 
113. web-
coldfusion.rules 
114. web-frontpage.rules 
115. web-iis.rules 
116. web-misc.rules 
117. web-php.rules 
118. x11.rules 
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3. Experiments and Results 
We implemented RSMA in Python on an Ubuntu 16 x64 Workstation and ran it against Snort IDPS. Snort is a rule-
based IDPS developed by Martin Roesch in 198811,21. Roesch founded Sourcefire in 2001 in response to demand for 
a commercial version of the popular technology. Sourcefire was acquired by Cisco Systems on October 7, 201315.
Table 2. On-Off State for Snort Rules Versions 2.9.7.0 versus 2.9.8.3 
 SnortRuleSetVersion2.9.7.0 SnortRuleSetVersion2.9.8.3 Difference
Action No. of Rules 
Enabled 
No. of Rules 
Disabled 
Total No. of Rules 
Enabled 
No. of Rules 
Disabled 
Total No. of Rules 
Enabled 
No. of Rules 
Disabled 
Total
ALERT 6010 31,556 37,566 8304 37,558 45,862 2294 6,002 8,296 
LOG 0 1470 1,470 0 1735 1,735 0 265 265 
PASS 1 446 447 0 630 630 1 184 183 
ACTIVATE 0 25 25 0 31 31 0 6 6 
DYNAMIC 0 16 16 0 23 23 0 7 7 
DROP 0 7720 7,720 0 13905 13,905 0 6,185 6,185 
REJECT 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
SDROP 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Total 6,011 41,235 47,246 8,304 53,884 62,188 2293 12649 14,942 
Snort provides two sets of rules; one is for paid subscribers, the other is for registered users. The rule sets for 
registered users is a 30-day delayed feed of the rules provided to subscribers. Snort rules are provided under a 
license that prohibits their commercial re-use; see https://www.snort.org/license for complete details. A third set of 
rules, the Community Snort Rules, is freely available to all Snort users. Rule sets are available at the Snort website, 
https://www.snort.org/downloads. Our experimental work concentrated on the rules for registered users only. Rule 
set files are archived in a tar.gz format.  
When a particular archived rule sets file (e.g., snortrules-snapshot-2983.tar.gz) is extracted with the command 
tar zxvf snortrules-snapshot-29xx.tar.gz, the following four folders are created: etc, preproc_rules, 
rules and so_rules. The folder, etc, consists of configuration files, and preproc_rules consists of preprocessing rules. 
The rules folder consists of rules written in regular Snort rule language. The directory, so_rules, consists of shared 
object rules. Shared Object rule language is essentially like the C language. These rules allow for detections that are 
not possible under regular Snort rule language and allow for obfuscation of exact detection. The rule set’s name is 
usually indicative of the kinds of rules that it possesses. The deleted.rules rule set, for example, consists of the set of 
rules that have become obsolete and are no longer in use.   
We ran RSMA with the rules directory as input for each of the following five rule versions: 2.9.7.0, 2.9.7.6, 
2.9.8.0, 2.9.8.2 and 2.9.8.3, respectively. Rules in Snort are disabled when they are preceded by the hash symbol, #. 
Absence of this symbol means that the rule is enabled. The number of rule sets in the rules directory can be 
determined by typing the command ls | wc -l at the terminal within that directory. It was found that there were 
118 rule sets in this folder. Their names are provided in Table 1. Given a particular rule action, the algorithm 
searches through each of the rule sets in Table 1 to determine which rules were enable/disable state and the total of 
each. The results are presented in Table 2. Enabled and disabled states for versions 2.9.7.6, 2.9.8.0, 2.9.8.2 and 
2.9.8.3 were found to be the same. However, these differed, sometimes markedly, with version 2.9.7.0. Thus, Table 
2 compares enable and disabled states of version 2.9.7.0 with version 2.9.8.3 only. The table shows that the ALERT 
action was the most frequently implemented action (37,566 for version 2.9.7.0 and 45,862 for version 2.9.8.3). In 
going from version 2.9.7.0 to version 2.9.8.3, we found that there was a 32% increase in the number of rules. 
Generally, it was found that the majority of rules were disabled; 87% in each of the versions examined. The 
REJECT and SDROP action were implemented by one rule each, both of which were disabled by default.  
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Fig. 1 is a plot of rule set index as given in Table 1 (abscissa) versus the number of individual rules invoking the 
ALERT action for the corresponding rule set (ordinate). It is seen that the delete.rules rule set contains the most 
rules (9,194), followed by the malware-cnc.rules rule set (5125). Snort does not delete rules, but moves them to the 
delete.rules rule set when they are no longer useful. All of the rules in the delete.rules rule set should be disabled. 
Fig. 1. Number of rules invoking the ALERT action vs. Rule Set index for Snort Rules Version 2.9.8.3  
To gain a deeper understanding of the data, the tool, Weka22, was employed to study some of the statistical 
properties of the data and to examine whether any hidden patterns existed in it. Weka is a collection of machine 
learning algorithms for data mining tasks23. A probability-based clustering algorithm was used to attempt to detect 
hidden meaning in the data. From a probabilistic perspective, the goal of clustering is to find the most likely set of 
clusters given a specific data set. The algorithm employed Gaussian mixture modeling and used the EM (expectation 
maximization) algorithm to estimate the Gaussian parameters.  
For the clustering experiment, the data consists of eight columns, each representing a different Snort rule action 
(i.e., a field). Each row represents one of the 118 rule sets. Hence, a value in a row represents the number of rules in 
the corresponding rule set that invoke the action in the corresponding column. 66% of the data was used for training, 
and the remainder for testing. The results are provided in Figure 2. They show that rules can belong to one of two 
clusters. We call these Cluster 0 and Cluster 1, and for convenience, we flip cluster names for the Version 2.9.8.3 
results (left subfigure). For the two rule versions we considered—versions 2.9.7.0 and 2.9.8.3--a rule has an 83% 
chance of appearing in Cluster 0 and 17% chance of appearing in Cluster 1. With respect to the action they invoke, 
generally, Cluster 0 rules tend to have significantly higher means and standard deviations than Cluster 1 rules.  
4. Conclusion 
This work developed an algorithm to monitor the enable/disable states of rules in a signature based IDPS. The 
algorithm was implemented in Python and, as a test case, it was executed with Snort rules as input. Five different 
Snort rule versions were used: versions 2.9.7.0, 2.9.7.6, 2.9.8.0, 2.9.8.2 and 2.9.8.3. We found the results for the 
latter four versions to be the same.  
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Fig. 2 Clustering Results – 2.9.8.3 (left) and 2.9.7.0 (right) 
However, they differed from the version 2.9.7.0 rules. It was found that the Snort rules folder consisted of 118 
rulesets across all versions. Further, the ALERT action was the most frequently used rule action, with a total of 
45,862 rules using this action in the version 2.9.8.3 release and 37,566 for version 2.9.7.0. In going from version 
2.9.7.0 to version 2.9.8.3, there was a 32% increase in the number of rules. We found generally that the majority of 
rules were disabled (87% in all rule versions). The REJECT and SDROP action were implemented by one rule each, 
both of which were disabled by default. Thus most of the rules by default are preset to disabled and, thus, may not 
provide adequate protection. To increase the level of protection offered by the Snort IDS, a user would need to 
conduct a thorough review and judicious enabling of rules when a system is first activated. In a future work, we plan 
to expand our study to other rule sets and to other signature based systems. In the current implementation, 
comparisons to determine changes in rules enable/disable state when the algorithm is executed at different times, 
must be done manually. We plan to automate this process in a future work. Finally, we plan to also gather statistics 
on the dynamic behavior of both enabled and disabled rules. 
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